{"id":1437,"date":"2026-06-10T15:03:21","date_gmt":"2026-06-10T15:03:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/education-in-lebanon-between-chronic-crises-lack-of-funding-and-emergency-policies\/"},"modified":"2026-10-01T09:52:06","modified_gmt":"2026-10-01T09:52:06","slug":"education-in-lebanon-between-chronic-crises-lack-of-funding-and-emergency-policies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/education-in-lebanon-between-chronic-crises-lack-of-funding-and-emergency-policies\/","title":{"rendered":"Education in Lebanon Between Chronic Crises and the Absence of Emergency Funding and Policies"},"content":{"rendered":"

International experience shows that, during wars, natural disasters, and health and economic crises, governments often adopt exceptional fiscal and monetary policies to mitigate the impact of shocks on society. In many cases, states expand public spending, allocate emergency budgets, support essential sectors, and ensure the continuity of vital services such as education, healthcare, and social protection.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Lebanese case, however, presents a different picture. The successive crises that have unfolded over the past years reveal a persistent pattern of financial and administrative inertia, with the state continuing to rely on virtually the same policies without any meaningful shift toward exceptional crisis management.<\/span><\/p>\n

This shortcoming is particularly evident in the education sector. Successive Lebanese governments have treated education as a non-productive sector rather than as a strategic pillar of national development. As a result, long-term planning has been absent, as have emergency plans and exceptional funding mechanisms capable of protecting the official education system and ensuring the continuity of learning during times of crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this article, we seek to understand why no emergency budget has been allocated to education during crises and wars, and why a comprehensive vision for protecting education in such circumstances remains absent.<\/span><\/p>\n

A Continuing Education Crisis<\/b><\/h2>\n

Since 2019, Lebanon has been grappling with a series of compounded crises that have profoundly affected the education sector. The financial collapse, followed by the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, and later by wars and escalating security tensions, has exposed the fragility of the education system and its limited capacity to adapt. The quality of education has declined significantly as a result of repeated disruptions to schooling, inadequate funding, institutional collapse<\/span>, declining enrolment<\/span>, the accumulation of learning loss<\/span>, and the continued loss of instructional days.<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite the scale of the crisis, successive governments have failed to develop a comprehensive rescue plan for education. Instead, public spending has remained at its minimum levels, with an almost exclusive focus on covering operational costs, salaries, and social benefits. International standards, including UNESCO recommendations, call for allocating between 15% and 20% of government expenditure to education in developing countries<\/span>. Yet Lebanon remained well below these benchmarks for many years, at around 6%, before the education share in the 2026 budget rose nominally to 12%, largely as a result of increased salaries and social benefits rather than any genuine increase in investment in the sector’s development<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The figures alone do not reflect any real improvement. The bulk of public spending is directed toward covering basic operational expenses rather than modernising schools, updating curricula, investing in educational technology, or strengthening institutional capacity. The distribution of allocations in the state budget also reveals the weakness of effective government investment across various sectors, including education.<\/span><\/p>\n

Chronic Dependence on External Funding<\/b><\/h2>\n

For decades, major educational projects in Lebanon have relied heavily on external funding. Curriculum reforms in the early 1970s, the 1997 curriculum overhaul, and the current development initiatives have all been financed primarily through international grants or loans. Even recent initiatives under the S2R2 framework, including curriculum reform and the development of educational administration, continue to be funded by the World Bank and other international donors.<\/span><\/p>\n

Between 2011 and 2022 alone, grants, aid, loans, and in-kind contributions to the education sector exceeded US$1.7 billion from donor countries, in addition to more than US$2 billion spent by UNICEF over the same period.<\/span><\/p>\n

This reality reflects the absence of sustained national investment in education. The Lebanese state does not appear to possess an independent strategic vision for developing the sector, but instead continues to rely on international initiatives and external funding linked to global programmes such as <\/span>Education for All<\/span><\/i>, <\/span>Education Cannot Wait<\/span><\/i>, and the Sustainable Development Goals.<\/span><\/p>\n

Education has never truly become a government priority. Instead, it has remained dependent on the individual initiatives of certain ministers or administrations, without a coherent national policy linking education to economic, social, and cultural development. At the same time, the private education sector has steadily expanded and now enrols around 70% of all students, while the role of the official school system has continued to decline despite serving as the primary safeguard for the country’s most vulnerable populations.<\/span><\/p>\n

Spending Without a Vision<\/b><\/h2>\n

Over the past years, Lebanon’s education sector has received billions of dollars in grants, loans, and international assistance, particularly following the outbreak of the Syrian crisis and the influx of refugees into the country. International partners have financed a wide range of initiatives, including school construction, support for teachers’ salaries, social incentives, training programmes, rehabilitation projects, solar energy installations, digital platforms, and even school feeding programmes.<\/span><\/p>\n

Yet the results have remained limited. In fact, several indicators point to a decline in the quality of education and educational governance. Learning outcomes have deteriorated, dropout rates have increased, learning loss has accumulated, and teachers and education personnel have faced growing hardship as their social and economic conditions have continued to deteriorate.<\/span><\/p>\n

This demonstrates that funding alone is not enough in the absence of a strategic vision. Spending that is not tied to a clear reform agenda can become another factor in perpetuating the crisis rather than resolving it. Moreover, governments’ near-total reliance on external funding has increasingly tied education policies to donors’ priorities and conditions rather than to the country’s actual national needs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Wars and Emergencies: Education Outside the Priorities<\/b><\/h2>\n

Since the outbreak of the war in October 2023 and the subsequent escalation on Lebanese territory, the fragility of government emergency plans for dealing with the education sector has become increasingly apparent. Schools were used as shelters for displaced families without adequate educational alternatives being put in place, leading to the disruption of schooling across wide areas and depriving thousands of students, including those in relatively safe areas and refugee communities, of their right to education.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although the government adopted emergency plans in coordination with several ministries, the funding allocated to these efforts remained extremely limited. Relief operations relied primarily on civil society organisations, international agencies, and external assistance, while the state refrained from allocating a genuine emergency budget to address the impact of the war on education.<\/span><\/p>\n

Following the end of the first round of escalation, it became clear that a number of schools had been partially or completely damaged. Yet the government did not move to finance reconstruction through national resources, instead waiting for international loans and aid. The same pattern has been repeated during the latest war that erupted in February 2026: an absence of government funding, continued reliance on external assistance, and the postponement of solutions until international support arrives, without any meaningful effort to mobilise the country’s own financial or human resources to mitigate the crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Underutilisation of Educational Human Resources<\/b><\/h2>\n

The Ministry of Education possesses the second largest qualified human and administrative resource base in Lebanon, employing approximately 50,000 teachers, administrators, and staff members. These human resources could have played a central role during times of crisis, whether by organising education inside and outside displacement shelters, providing psychosocial support to children and families, or helping coordinate displacement response efforts.<\/span><\/p>\n

Instead, official emergency plans reduced the role of the Ministry of Education to little more than providing school buildings. No meaningful effort was made to mobilise the sector’s existing human capacities in areas such as alternative education, social activities, counselling, psychosocial support, or even contributing to the management of displacement-related affairs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Teachers and educators possess valuable expertise in working with children, adolescents, and persons with disabilities, as well as in health guidance and counselling. These capacities could have been integrated into a comprehensive national plan aimed at mitigating the effects of displacement and war. Instead, the state chose to leave most of these resources unused, relying instead on delayed attempts at remote learning despite the absence of adequate digital infrastructure.<\/span><\/p>\n

Where Do the Financial Savings Go?<\/b><\/h2>\n

Ironically, periods of war and institutional disruption can sometimes generate financial savings within public administrations, including the Ministry of Education. When schools close or staff attendance declines, transportation costs, operational expenses, and other running costs are reduced. Yet these savings are not redirected into emergency funds to support education or relief efforts; instead, they remain within the general accounts of the Ministry of Finance.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nor has the state adopted any flexible mechanism that would allow these resources to be redirected toward urgent priorities during times of crisis. This is partly due to the nature of Lebanon’s financial system, in which the budget remains largely fixed once approved, making it difficult to amend allocations or open exceptional appropriations without a lengthy and complex legislative process.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, the government failed to allocate emergency funding for digital education or to provide the tools necessary for remote learning, despite repeated rhetoric about digital transformation. Even projects announced years ago to develop comprehensive educational platforms have remained delayed or incomplete, despite the substantial sums already spent on them.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Need for a New Vision<\/b><\/h2>\n

The repeated crises Lebanon has experienced since 2000 reveal that the country’s fundamental problem lies not only in a lack of funding, but also in the absence of a strategic vision that recognises education as a cornerstone of development and stability. The state has not treated the official school system as a long-term national project, but rather as an operational burden subject to political bargaining and administrative constraints.<\/span><\/p>\n

Without changing this approach, no amount of grants or loans will be capable of bringing about meaningful transformation. Educational reform requires a comprehensive national strategy that links education to economic and social development while establishing clear emergency policies capable of ensuring the continuity of learning during wars and disasters.<\/span><\/p>\n

Lebanon must also rethink the way it manages its public resources, both financial and human, so that financial savings generated during crises can be redirected into exceptional funds supporting essential sectors instead of remaining frozen within the traditional financial system. At the same time, the social role of teachers should be strengthened to enable them to contribute more effectively to protecting communities during times of crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ultimately, education cannot be protected in a country that repeatedly faces crises without a genuine political commitment that recognises investment in people as the foundation of any meaningful recovery project. Education is not a secondary service that can simply be suspended whenever a crisis emerges; it is an essential condition for protecting society and rebuilding the state.<\/span><\/p>\n

References<\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

1<\/a> <\/span>\u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u0644\u064a\u0645 \u0641\u064a \u0638\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0627\u062a<\/a><\/u>: <\/span>\u0643\u064a\u0641 \u062a\u0639\u064a\u062f \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062a\u0631\u0627\u0643\u0645\u0629 \u0641\u064a \u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646 \u062a\u0634\u0643\u064a\u0644 \u0645\u0647\u0646\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u0644\u064a\u0645<\/span><\/span><\/span>–<\/span> \u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646\u064a\u0629\u060c \u062d\u0645\u0648\u062f <\/span>2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

2<\/a> <\/span>\u062a\u0637\u0648\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0625\u0644\u062a\u062d\u0627\u0642 \u0641\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062f\u0627\u0631\u0633 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062c\u0627\u0645\u0639\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0633\u0645\u064a\u0629 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062e\u0627\u0635\u0629 \u0641\u064a \u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646 \u0628\u064a\u0646 <\/a><\/u>2011 <\/span>\u0648 <\/span><\/span><\/span>2025- <\/span>\u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646\u064a\u0629\u060c <\/span>2024<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

3<\/a> <\/span>\u0627\u0644\u0641\u0627\u0642\u062f \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0631\u0627\u0643\u0645\u064a \u0644\u0623\u064a\u0627\u0645 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u062f\u0631\u064a\u0633 \u0628\u064a\u0646 <\/a><\/u>2016 <\/span>\u0648 <\/span><\/span><\/span>2025: <\/span>\u062a\u062d\u062f\u064a\u0627\u062a \u0648\u0642\u0641 \u0627\u0646\u0647\u064a\u0627\u0631 \u062c\u0648\u062f\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u0644\u064a\u0645 \u0641\u064a \u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646<\/span>. <\/span>\u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646\u064a\u0629 <\/span>2024<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

4<\/a> – <\/span> <\/span>\u0625\u0639\u0644\u0627\u0646 \u0625\u0646\u0634\u064a\u0648\u0646 <\/a><\/u>– <\/span>\u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u0644\u064a\u0645 \u0628\u062d\u0644\u0648\u0644 \u0639\u0627\u0645 <\/span><\/span><\/span>2030: <\/span>\u0646\u062d\u0648 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u0644\u064a\u0645 \u0627\u0644\u062c\u064a\u0651\u062f \u0627\u0644\u0645\u064f\u0646\u0635\u0641 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0634\u0627\u0645\u0644 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u0644\u064f\u0651\u0645 \u0645\u062f\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u064a\u0627\u0629 \u0644\u0644\u062c\u0645\u064a\u0639<\/span>– <\/span>\u0627\u0644\u064a\u0648\u0646\u0633\u0643\u0648 <\/span>2015.<\/span> \u0627\u0644\u0646\u0642\u0637\u0629 <\/span><\/span>14<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

5<\/a> <\/span>\u0627\u0644\u0645\u0648\u0627\u0632\u0646\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0627\u0645\u0629 \u0644\u0644\u0633\u0646\u0648\u0627\u062a <\/span>2018 <\/span>\u062d\u062a\u0649 <\/span>2026- <\/span>\u0645\u0648\u0642\u0639 \u0648\u0632\u0627\u0631\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0627\u0644\u064a\u0629 <\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

6<\/a> <\/span>\u0643\u0644\u0641\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u0644\u064a\u0645 \u0641\u064a \u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646\u060c \u0625\u0646\u0641\u0627\u0642 \u0627\u0644\u062e\u0632\u064a\u0646\u0629 \u0648\u0625\u0646\u0641\u0627\u0642 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062c\u062a\u0645\u0639\u060c \u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646\u064a\u0629 \u060c \u0646\u0639\u0645\u0647<\/a><\/u>. 2023<\/span> \u0635\u0641\u062d\u0629 <\/span><\/span><\/span>65<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

7<\/a> \u0627<\/span>\u0644\u0645\u0631\u062c\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u0633\u0627\u0628\u0642<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

8<\/a> <\/u><\/span>\u062a\u0637\u0648\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0625\u0644\u062a\u062d\u0627\u0642 \u0641\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062f\u0627\u0631\u0633 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062c\u0627\u0645\u0639\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0633\u0645\u064a\u0629 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062e\u0627\u0635\u0629 \u0641\u064a \u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646 \u0628\u064a\u0646<\/a> <\/u>2011 <\/span>\u0648 <\/span><\/span><\/span>2025- <\/span>\u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u0631\u0627\u0633\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0644\u0628\u0646\u0627\u0646\u064a\u0629\u060c <\/span>2024<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

*The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the journal or the Lebanese Studies Center, but represent only the opinion of its author. <\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

What are the reasons for the failure to allocate an emergency budget for education during crises or wars, and for the absence of a comprehensive vision to protect education during such times?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":768,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[116],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1437","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-affairs"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1437","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1437"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1437\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1680,"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1437\/revisions\/1680"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/768"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1437"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1437"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/education-monitor.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1437"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}